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Introduction
Natural Order and the Revolution
The Russian Revolution of 1917 came as a surprise not only to 
millions of Russians but also to the elites in the rest of the world. 
Few scholars, politicians and historians both in Russia and abroad 
had suspected that the highly conservative and rural country 
could overtake the Western powers on their way to economic 
egalitarianism. In fact, there was a precedent seven years before: 
the Mexican Revolution. The main problem, however, was not 
in Russia’s lack of readiness but in the fact that after the tragic 
events of 1917 the state seemed to have completely changed its 
own system of values. 
Russia under the old regime can be described as an empire: 
a kind of state which is neither completely national nor completely 
universal. Upon establishing the Russian Empire in 1721, Peter 
the Great could not draw a clear definition of the new political 
being. However, one has to remember that the vast plains east of 
Poland underwent essential rather than accidental changes several 
times before the Russian empire was officially established. Before 
862, according to the Primary Chronicle, it was a badly organized 
collection of East Slavic settlements. Then it began to be ruled by 
a Scandinavian elite, gaining the new Germanic name – Rus’, and 
becoming a semi-military organization economically based on 
DOI: 10.12797/9788376389042.01
8 Joachim Diec
several burghs and on the route toward the Black Sea. The next step 
was taken by Prince Volodimir the Great, who decided to baptize 
himself and his people according to the Byzantine rite tradition. 
The East Christian (after 1054 – Orthodox) Old Rus’, whose main 
center moved from Novgorod to Kiev, broke apart after the death 
of Yaroslav the Wise, a brilliant ruler, and the capital moved again 
– to Vladimir on Klazma (Primary Chronicle, transl. of 1953).
At the end of the 1230s, the municipalities were invaded by 
Batu-Khan, the leader of the Mongol Western (Golden) Horde. 
After that, the East of historical Rus’ was subordinated to the 
despotic leadership of the Golden Horde and was permeated 
with the Mongol principles of militarism, centralism and absolute 
monarchy where the will of the leader was the only source of 
law. However, the Orthodox church was an exception: it enjoyed 
relative respect and was in no way affected by the despotic Crimean 
state. The situation was different in the western part of the old 
Kievan domain, which was liberated from the Mongol hegemony 
and annexed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and (in the case of 
Galicia) by Poland. 
When in the 15th century Moscow became the leading power 
in the area controlled by the Horde, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, 
which in 1547, thanks to the ambitions of Ivan the Terrible, was 
named Tsardom of All Rus’, adopted some essential Mongol 
political standards, but at the same time it cultivated the myth of 
the Third Rome – the bedrock of the only true faith. Moscow was 
different from the Catholic and Protestant West and glorified its 
own uniqueness (as emphasized by the German emperor’s envoy, 
Herberstein, 1557). 
At the beginning of the age of Enlightenment, Peter the Great 
dispelled the myth of the unique Orthodox domain and began to 
construct a new state – the Russian Empire, which was supposed 
to become one of the leading European powers. The mission of the 
state was in the state itself: the Tsar, who was now officially titled 
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Emperor, exercised all key prerogatives, even the ones that referred 
to the church since the institution of patriarchy was abolished.
A short review was provided to illustrate the fact that the 
Russian state changed its origin myth several times. As it was 
expressed by Petr Chaadaev, the founder of Russian intellectual 
westernism, in his famous First Philosophical Letter, Russia has 
no history – it has built its own civilization from scratch several 
times:
Our memories reach back no further than yesterday; we are, as 
it were, strangers to ourselves. We move through time in such 
a singular manner that, as we advance, the past is lost to us forever. 
That is but a natural consequence of a culture that consists entirely of 
imports and imitation. Among us there is no internal development, 
no natural progress; new ideas sweep out the old, because they 
are not derived from the old but tumble down upon us from who 
knows where. We absorb all our ideas ready-made, and therefore 
the indelible trace left in the mind by a progressive movement of 
ideas, which gives it strength, does not shape our intellect. We grow, 
but we do not mature; we move, but along a crooked path, that is, 
one that does not lead to the desired goal. We are like children who 
have not been taught to think for themselves: when they become 
adults, they have nothing of their own – all their knowledge is on the 
surface of their being, their soul is not within them. That is precisely 
our situation.
Peoples, like individuals, are moral beings. Their education takes 
centuries, as it takes years for that of persons. In a way, one could 
say that we are an exception among peoples. We are one of those 
nations, which do not seem to be an integral part of the human 
race, but exist only in order to teach some great lesson to the world 
(Chaadaev, 1829). 
Does that mean that the Russian Revolution of 1917 should 
not be treated as a disaster and at the same time something 
extraordinary in the history of the great country? The answer 
is not easy since the essence of the problem lies in the criteria 
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one could apply for the analysis. In the same way as it was after 
the Petrine Reforms, the conservatives (national traditionalists), 
such as the Slavophiles, tried to emphasize the fact that the radical 
change humiliated the nation and acted against its spiritual 
essence (Alschen, 2013, p. 26). After the revolution of 1917, 
countless thinkers complained about the violation of Russian 
values: nationalists such as Ivan Ilyin, Christian philosophers with 
Nikolai Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov and Petr Struve at the helm, the 
liberal camp headed by Pavel Milyukov and even revolutionary 
socialists such as Victor Chernov criticized and demonized Lenin 
(Чернов, 1924).
The main objective of this book results from the dilemma 
of total change and is to determine at least some of the essential 
characteristics of the Russian Revolution that reveal themselves 
in some closer and further consequences. This means that one of 
the basic assumptions of the book is that it is possible to trace old 
mental constructions in contemporary processes even though, as 
it was mentioned above, Russia has a strong inclination toward 
total annihilation of former formulas.
The first task was to draw a comprehensive image of the new 
legal principles that underlay the revolutionary reforms. This way, 
in Chapter 1, we try to reconstruct the Bolshevik understanding 
of law and state, which became the obligatory set of norms for 
several generations of people who spent most of their lives under 
the communist rule.
Chapter 2 briefly analyzes the relation between state, business 
and society before and after the revolution of 1917. The intention 
of the text is to point out the traditional forms of the relation and 
the new, unexpected ones, which lead to different practical results. 
We assume that the mechanisms worked out in the times of Witte 
and Stolypin were in fact deconstructed or even totally negated in 
the following years, which led to various kinds of socio-economic 
disaster. That is why the Russian state has to seek new forms of 
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public and economic management with the main imperatives of 
democratic incentive and economic effectiveness.
The next two chapters focus on questions concerning selected 
problems which affected Russia after the collapse of the USSR. 
One of them refers to Russia’s foreign policy – to the secessions in 
the post-Soviet area, which are treated as consequences of an odd 
interpretation of international law. The purpose of the chapter is 
to analyze the Russian elite’s attitude to the customary, relatively 
established norms that underlie the world order and to provide 
material for conclusions about the revolutionary legacy as an 
explanatory factor for aggressive international behaviors.
Chapter 4, which refers to contemporary processes, is nominally 
about something that has not happened: a hypothetical, potential 
revolution which is supposed to introduce another paradigm of 
the Russian state. We ask the question about the probability of 
a nationalist revolt in Russia, which was proclaimed by many 
thinkers but never realized by the angry people. We thus suggest 
that Russia’s present-day identity is somewhat unclear and that 
a search for another origin myth makes sense. 
Last but not least, looking for the core of revolutionary thinking, 
we would like to present a study of political gnosis which underlies 
many radical changes. Gnostic thinking has always been based on 
axiological oppositions: equality and inequality, progressivity and 
reaction, paving the road to violence in the name of the light side 
of the Force. This way we try to suggest that the gnostic paradigm 
can be an efficient explanatory device for the description of 
a revolutionary mentality.
Those who accuse the revolutionary thinking of being 
responsible for particular crimes as well as for social and 
spiritual destruction in general usually emphasize the violation 
of “naturalness”. Revolutions are charged with the imposition 
of artificial and harmful intellectual simplifications which are 
opposed to the spontaneous and natural order of things. The 
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understanding of natural order, however, has varied throughout 
centuries and depended mainly on the ideological position of 
theoreticians. The notion of natural order is related to the concept 
of natural law, which has been explored in philosophical and 
theological doctrines several times. We understand natural order 
as a state of beings (including humans) that allows them to 
behave according to natural law without restrictions. The scope 
of these two notions may include various areas; in our book they 
refer to the social, political and economic spheres of the state. 
Natural law is not necessarily equal to the state of nature, which 
we understand as a spontaneous outcome of the functioning of 
nature (even if “nature” refers to the functioning of humans). This 
term usually refers to the pre-social or pre-civilizational state 
of mankind, to a theoretical rather than historical wilderness. 
If we look at the most customary understanding of natural 
law, we realize that it is generally depicted as a set of principles 
that lead people to goodness. This concept of natural law was 
initiated by classical Greek philosophers such as Empedocles, 
Plato and Aristotle, who is usually treated as the philosopher 
who formulated the problem in the most complete form in the 
ancient times (Aristotle, 1998, p. 58). The concept of natural law 
was in a way tackled in Genesis, in the description of Cain’s sin 
and in Abraham’s hesitation about God’s intentions concerning 
Sodom (Genesis, 18,25), and by St. Paul in his Epistle to Romans 
(Romans, 2, 14–15). Natural law was treated with proper attention 
by the Fathers, including St. Augustine, and by medieval thinkers, 
including St. Thomas Aquinas, who claimed that it is because of 
natural law that rational beings can participate in eternal law. 
Since the latter is not entirely intelligible for imperfect humans, 
they have to resort to Divine Law, which is given by God to save 
people from errors and eternal condemnation (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, I-II, qq. 90–106). The authority of natural law also lies 
behind Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, which elaborates 
on basic human rights rather than obligations. 
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If we consider the topic of the state of nature, the vision might 
not be that optimistic because the understanding of nature is not 
necessarily associated with rights; it can also be comprehended 
as the perceived world of living organisms. One of the oldest 
concepts of naturalness comes from Hobbes, whose vision of the 
nature of man seems quite pessimistic: 
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of 
quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. 
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and 
the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves 
Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the 
second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, 
a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct 
in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their 
Nation, their Profession, or their Name.
There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby 
it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power 
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For 
WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in 
a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently 
known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in 
the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the 
nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but 
in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of 
War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition 
thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All 
other time is PEACE.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where 
every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the 
time, wherein men live without other security, than what their 
own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. 
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit 
thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by 
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Sea; no comimodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and 
removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of 
the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no 
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of 
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, 
and short (Hobbes, 1651, ch. 13).
The state of nature depicted in such a way seems to be an 
obstacle rather than a proper environment for human activity. In 
other words, the natural man cannot put up with the state of nature, 
which is described as bellum omnium contra omnes and interferes 
with the divine commandment to be fruitful and multiply. This 
way we realize that natural law (as the emanation of eternal law), 
which is an intelligible structure of moral goodness and prosperity, 
takes people away from the state of nature and locates the source of 
naturalness in another order. It is not necessarily true that Locke’s 
treatise provides a polemic narrative against Hobbes; it is rather 
a tale about another kind of nature, one which is able to overcome 
terrestrial physical inequality and subordinate all men to a law 
that is in a way perceived in one’s life experience but does not 
refer to the physical world. What both Hobbes and Locke aimed at 
is the liberation from spontaneous brutality and the construction 
of the “state of predictability”, which is entirely different from 
the state of nature. The latter is structurally expressed in social 
Darwinism, where the death of the weak is perceived as natural 
and even advisable for developing species. 
The notion of natural order is also associated with some other 
understandings. In some concepts, natural order is artistic: art 
may create forms which either reflect higher “natural” harmony 
or distort it. Even within the blurry category of art one can realize 
that people as social beings tend to invoke a higher order which is 
supposed to be natural in a non-physical sense of naturalness. 
In the tradition of economic liberalism, naturalness and 
natural order refer to the wealth of nations, which is supposed to 
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grow only if the authorities open the state’s economy to the power 
of the invisible hand of the free market. The classical principle of 
no governmental support and no barriers, which was suggested 
by Adam Smith, was later expressed in some other incarnations 
of liberalism including the works of Friedrich von Hayek. Hayek 
makes a distinction between two kinds of order. One of them 
is achieved by arranging the relations between the parts according to 
a preconceived plan we call in the social field an organization. The 
extent to which the power of many men can be increased by such 
deliberate co-ordination of their efforts is well-known and many of 
the achievements of man rest on the use of this technique. 
The other one 
...which is characteristic not only of biological organisms (to which 
the originally much wider meaning of the term organism is now 
usually confined), is an order which is not made by anybody but 
which forms itself. It is for this reason usually called a “spontaneous” 
or sometimes (for reasons we shall yet explain) a ‘polycentric’ order. 
If we understand the forces which determine such an order, we can 
use them by creating the conditions under which such an order will 
form itself (Hayek, 1981).
As a matter of fact, Hayek’s understanding of natural order in 
economy still sticks to the Darwinian scheme since the state of 
naturalness in the circumstances of a free market is unpredictable. 
The libertarian concepts (such as the one of Robert Nozick) do not 
add anything important to this narrative apart from the idea of the 
minimum state. It seems, however, that a deeper understanding of 
the question has been proposed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who 
criticizes democracy (as opposed to monarchy) because of its 
natural inclination to promote elites that lack basic moral values. 
A truly democratic elite is a bunch of expropriators who in the 
long run are unable to foster production. That is why a “private 
government” seems more productive:
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The defining characteristic of private government ownership is that 
the expropriated resources and the monopoly privilege of future 
expropriation are individually owned. The appropriated resources 
are added to the ruler’s private estatе and treated as if they were 
a part of it, and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation 
is attached as a title to this In contrast, with a publicly owned 
government the control over the government apparatus lies in the 
hands of a trustee, or caretaker. The caretaker may use the apparatus 
to his personal advantage, but he does not own it. He cannot sell 
government resources and privately pocket the receipts, nor can he 
pass government possessions onto his personal heir. He owns the 
current use of government resources, but not their capital value. 
Moreover, while entrance into the position of a private owner of 
government is restricted by the owner’s personal discretion, entrance 
into the position of a caretaker-ruler is open. Anyone, in principle, 
can become the government’s caretaker.
From these assumptions two central, interrelated predictions 
can be deduced: (1) A private government owner will tend to 
have a systematically longer planning horizon, i.e., his degree 
of time preference will be lower, and accordingly, his degree of 
economic exploitation will tend to be less than that of a government 
caretaker; and (2), subject to a higher degree of exploitation the 
nongovernmental public will also be comparatively more present- 
-oriented under a system of publicly owned government than 
under a regime of private government ownership. (1) A private 
government owner will predictably try to maximize his total wealth; 
i.e., the present value of his estate and his current income. He will not 
want to increase his current income at the expense of a more than 
proportional drop in the present value of his assets, and because 
acts of current income acquisition invariably have repercussions 
on present asset values (reflecting the value of all future-expected- 
-asset earnings discounted by the rate of time preference), private 
ownership in and of itself leads to economic calculation and thus 
promotes farsightedness.
In the case of the private ownership of government, this implies 
a distinct moderation with respect to the ruler’s incentive to exploit 
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his monopoly privilege of expropriation, for acts of expropriation 
are by their nature parasitic upon prior acts of production on the 
part of the nongovernmental public. Where nothing has first been 
produced, nothing can be expropriated; and where everything is 
expropriated, all future production will come to a shrieking halt 
(Hoppe, 2001, pp. 45-46).
Upon examining the history of Russia in the early decades of 
the 20th century, one may come to the realization that the Hoppean 
scheme describes the situation of Russia’s society and economy. 
Before the beginning of WW1, the growth of production in this 
country was in almost all sectors one of the fastest in Europe. The 
legal regulations in Russia’s absolute monarchy provided sufficient 
stability for investors and capital could be accumulated in an 
atmosphere of security. The revolution, which was an outcome of 
the highly destructive war, abolished these conditions and led to 
an economic and social disaster, especially during the time of War 
Communism. Russia became subject to a totalitarian experiment, 
where expropriation became the principle of new justice: “rob 
what has been robbed” (see brilliant descriptions of the process in 
Wolfe (1969) and Lohr (2003)). 
What has to be emphasized, however, is the fact that the idea 
of expropriation cannot be separated from the problem of social 
stratification. The red camp – the Bolsheviks – and, in the “soft” 
version, the democratic leftists such as the Mensheviks or the 
Socialist Revolutionaries, proclaimed far-reaching egalitarianism. 
Its range stretched from the abolition of private property of land 
to the nationalization of industry and banks. This way the new 
authorities got rid of the old economic elite, which had been 
formed over decades (or even centuries), but in the other spheres 
the situation was by no means better: most of the Orthodox 
clergymen were either shot on the spot or placed in labor camps, 
white officers who did not manage to escape had to account for 
being shot (if they were lucky enough to avoid torture), most 
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academic and high school teachers, lawyers etc. had to escape 
from Russia to become cabbies or janitors in Western Europe or 
put up with gradual marginalization and, in the Stalin era, with 
ultimate physical liquidation, which usually involved a long and 
“active” interrogation. 
This way the new incarnation of Russia – the Soviet Union 
– had to be conducted by its new elite, which was nominally 
“democratic” in the sense that it tried to appreciate “the people”. 
The new leaders were originally recruited from the Bolshevik 
Party, VKP(b), which was a collection of radical leftists who 
generally belonged to the margin of the imperial society. The 
most prominent ones were either entirely uprooted or had dark 
biographies like Stalin, the leading expropriator and experienced 
murderer, who earned money for the party by robbing banks 
(Sebag Montefiore, 2007). The dramatic events that took place in 
1917 and in the following years formed a dysfunctional system 
which was supposed to be a negation of both absolute monarchy 
and liberal democracy. The new regime tried to disqualify the 
tyranny based on the domination of one person and the ideological 
superstructure of the Orthodox faith combined with the imaginary 
pressure of Great Russian chauvinism. It also refuted the liberal 
dreams which, as they believed, led to appalling social inequality 
and to the establishment of the bourgeoisie – a parasitic false elite 
that deterred the proletariat from genuine development. These 
convictions not only led to such things as the physical liquidation 
of the liberal and socialist opposition as well as the imperial family, 
but they also wiped out the institution of private property. 
The Bolsheviks and a number of useful idiots in the West, 
according to the principles of Marxism, believed that the 
experiment may open new opportunities to the development 
of humanity and become an alternative to the older systemic 
solutions. However, as it was emphasized by Hoppe, the search for 
a more humane order (i.e. one that incites positive development) 
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may consist in something entirely different. The legitimacy of 
monarchical rule “appears to have been irretrievably lost” but
 ...at the same time, and still more importantly, a positive alternative 
to monarchy and democracy – the idea of a natural order – must 
be delineated and understood. On the one hand, this involves 
the recognition that it is not exploitation, either monarchical 
or democratic, but private property, production, and voluntary 
exchange that are the ultimate sources of human civilization. 
On the other hand, it involves the recognition of a fundamental 
sociological insight (which incidentally also helps identify precisely 
where the historic opposition to monarchy went wrong): that the 
maintenance and preservation of a private property based exchange 
economy requires as its sociological presupposition the existence of 
a voluntarily acknowledged natural elite – a nobilitas naturalis. 
The natural outcome of the voluntary transactions between 
various private property owners is decidedly non-egalitarian, 
hierarchical, and elitist. As the result of widely diverse human talents, 
in every society of any degree of complexity a few individuals quickly 
acquire the status of an elite. Owing to superior achievements of 
wealth, wisdom, bravery or a combination thereof, some individuals 
come to possess “natural authority,” and their opinions and 
judgments enjoy widespread respect. Moreover, because of selective 
mating and marriage and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance, 
positions of natural authority are more likely than not passed on 
within a few noble families. It is to the heads of these families with 
long-established records of superior achievement, farsightedness, 
and exemplary personal conduct that men turn with their conflicts 
and complaints against each other, and it is these very leaders of 
the natural elite who typically act as judges and peacemakers, often 
free of charge, out of a sense of obligation required and expected of 
a person of authority or even out of a principled concern for civil 
justice, as a privately produced “public good” (Hoppe, 2001, p. 71).
To conclude, we realize that such a concept of natural order 
provokes several questions referring to the legacy of the Russian 
Revolution, which broke out to boost the self-esteem of the 
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Russian people. First of all, we are entitled to ask about the nature 
of unnaturalness, which is supposed to be the core of social evil. 
Next, we also have to explore the issue of equality: the problem of 
the people and of the elite in the context of revolutionary ideas and 
events. Another issue lies in the relation between the revolution 
and the natural order, which is the basic question of our book. 
Last but not least, we also have to examine the Russian Revolution 
in the context of natural order from the pragmatic perspective. In 
other words, we assume that the unclear intuition of naturalness 
in the spheres of politics (both internal and international), 
economy and social life reveals itself in the commonly perceived 
and mathematically articulated prosperity and security.
